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Abstract
Increases in inequality between low and high-skilled workers are likely to affect welfare state
policies in upcoming decades. Demand for redistribution puts pressure on marginal income-tax
rates and other social security measures. 
We come to this conclusion by confronting expected supply and demand for skill. If demand
for skill continues to increase at the pace of the last decades, supply has to keep up its high rate
of growth of the last decades too. A priori, the former is plausible, the latter is not. This paper
makes this point and sketches the major uncertainties surrounding the underlying trends. 
Keywords: Inequality, Policy, Social Security, Cross-country comparison
JEL-codes: I28, H24, J31, J38
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 1 This paper is prepared for the scenario study on the future of Europe, to appear in October 2003. We acknowledge
comments by Theo van de Klundert, Ruud de Mooij and Paul Tang.
2 In talking about the skill premium, we refer to skills that are valued in the labour market like education and
experience. In most of the remainder, the discussion is restricted to skills related to education. In many cases,
however, the same arguments hold for experience. Only where necessary explicit reference will be made to
experience.
3 Inequality leads to popular pressure for redistribution via distortionary taxation, which in turn lowers economic
growth. For evidence, see Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Perotti (1996).
4 This does not conflict with the previous point: there is no robust evidence for a positive effect of human capital
on economic growth. Sianesi and Van Reenen (2002) provide a recent survey of the empirical literature on the
macroeconomic effects of human capital. This literature is largely inconclusive over whether the stock of education
affects the long-run level or long-run growth rate of the economy. They conclude that an increase in average
education of the population by one year would raise the level of output per capita by between three and six percent
according to the former approach, while in general the effect on growth is overstated in the literature. Their overall
conclusion is therefore that the evidence in favour of the growth effect is quite weak for developed countries.
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1 Introduction1
The rise in income inequality in the USA has provoked a large debate on its causes and possible
remedies. From this literature, no consensus has (yet) emerged. Different theoretically plausible
explanations have been offered, mainly focussing on the so-called skill premium.2 Providing
empirical evidence is difficult and empirical results on the rise in income inequality are largely
inconclusive when compared and put together. The future developments are therefore difficult
to predict. Still, they are important as income inequality constitutes one of the key indicators to
evaluate economic performance. Furthermore, inequality is likely to affect the formulation of
welfare state policies. Therefore, the major question that this paper deals with is:
What are the major determinants of the skill premium and what are the likely trends in
these determinants? In answering this question, we address both the evolution of the
skill premium over time as well as the differences between countries.
The relevance of the skill-premium can be illustrated in several ways. First, the skill premium
determines to a large extent income inequality, which in turn is an important determinant of
economic growth.3 Second, the skill premium is an important determinant of the incentive to
accumulate human capital which in turn fosters economic growth.4 Third, inequality is an
important determinant of social and economic instability. 
On the basis of a careful analysis of the available evidence, we will argue that there has been
a long-term trend in demand for skills, that has dominated the development of the skill
premium. The underlying factors resulting in this bias are various, all of which will be explored.
These factors range from demand shocks associated with the arrival of new General Purpose
 5 Note that ceteris paribus higher-quality graduates increase inequality. This is countered by the general equilibrium
effect of more skill supply leading to lower prices per unit of skill. Our guess is that the first effect dominates.
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Technologies (GPTs) such as the computer, to trends associated with the increased capital
intensity of production processes along with a strong complementarity between physical capital
and skills. 
The resulting pressure exerted on income inequality can be dealt with in a variety of ways.
The first is to simply accept the increase in income inequality. Different countries make
different trade-offs in this respect. The second is to increase the supply of skills (both in terms of
quantity and quality) in order to match the increased demand. The third is to explicitly develop
policies that reduce the income inequality by using, for example, progressive income taxation.
One of the goals of this paper is to illustrate that the reaction of countries on the tendency for
income inequality to increase has been different. Although some answers can be given on which
answers are most appropriate, in many cases it is a matter of choice resulting in different socio-
economic outcomes on different dimensions of economic performance (see De Groot et al.,
2003, for an elaboration of this argument in a broader context). 
We argue that an obvious conclusion is that the demand for skill will continue to grow and
that the supply of skill can no longer accommodate this in the near future due to the simple fact
that talent is limited by nature and that the cost of increasing the supply of skills further
increases exponentially. This will unavoidably lead to large increases in inequality; a ‘bad’ that
can in principle be countered by policy. The pressure for undoing the inequality makes policy
more costly in terms of, for example, GDP per capita, as redistribution or policy intervention in
general is increasingly costly. How to solve the dilemma is a major issue for policy makers in the
future.
 However, necessary and important qualifications to this conclusion are to be made.
Extrapolating the demand trend for skill is hazardous as it is not precisely clear what is behind
this trend: is it increases in capital that is complementary to skill, or a technology trend? The
global supply of capital is likely to be altered by an ageing population and the associated
implications for aggregate savings (see, e.g., Fair and Dominguez, 1991, and Higgins, 1998).
And the technology trend driving up demand for skills has not always been as strong as in
recent decades. On the contrary, the past has shown technology trends that drove up the price of
unskilled labour. A second qualification is that the demand trend does not seem to work out
equally for all countries. This puzzle is dealt with in the paper, but is not solved. A third
qualification is that the supply of skills can be increased by improving the quality of the
schooling system such that more able students are ‘produced’. This qualification is scant
comfort as better qualified output of the educational system is not necessarily reducing
inequality.5
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To derive these conclusions, we proceed in a straightforward manner. First we develop an
analytical framework of analysis that helps in clarifying terminology and defines a theoretical
framework. Next, the facts on the supply and demand of skills and the resulting development of
the skill premium are presented for long time periods and a wide cross section of countries.
From these facts, we aim to deduce the major determinants of the skill premium. This is done
in Section 4 where a wide range of potential explanations for the observed trend is discussed.
We argue that a trend in demand is the most likely candidate for explaining the major part of the
development of the skill premium over time. From this we derive our main conclusion that
inequality is likely to increase further in the future. We further sketch the major uncertainties
surrounding this conclusion. In order to understand the differences in the skill premium across
countries, knowledge is required on the institutional context. As argued before, countries can
respond differently to similar shocks resulting in different outcomes in terms of, for example,
income inequality. These differences reflect the different trade-offs that countries make and are
discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains a discussion and description
of the data used in this study.
 10
 6 We refer to the Appendix for a discussion of the available sources and measures of income inequality and a
discussion of their strengths and weaknesses.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The skill premium and inequality
The skill premium is measured most directly by the relative wage of workers with two types of
schooling. Close to this measure is the Mincerian return to an additional year of schooling
(based on econometric estimates using micro-data for wages and controlling for other
characteristics). More remote is the earnings ratio of production and non-production workers.
This measure relies on the (clearly imperfect) assumption that production workers are low
skilled and non-production workers high skilled. Finally, there are three commonly used
measures based on the distribution of income: the Gini-coefficient, the Theil measure and the
percentile ratios. We use mostly the measures summarising the entire distribution.6
Figure 2.1 shows the Gini inequality measure for gross income (Primary Gini) and income
after taxes and transfers (Secondary Gini). We show the numbers for the most recent years that
are available (varying from 1992 to 1997). The countries are ordered according to the highest
reduction achieved by taxes and transfers. Sweden, for example reduces it’s inequality by almost
50%. The Anglo-Saxon countries can be found on the right-hand side of the figure whereas the
Nordic countries are on the left-hand side of the figure.
In Figure 2.2 we depict the annual percentage change in after-tax income inequality for a
large set of countries for the period between the early 1980s and 1995. The grey areas indicate
the change in inequality at the top half of the distribution and the light areas indicate that of the
lower half of the distribution (the black bars depict the annual change in income between the
bottom and the top of the distribution).
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Figure 2.1  Primary and secondary inequality (approximately 1994)
Source: Bradley et al. (2001).
Figure 2.2  Annual percentage change in inequality between the early 1980s and 1995
Source: LIS; see Appendix.
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Only Spain, Denmark and Luxembourg experienced a decline in inequality in the period
considered. All other countries experienced - though in different magnitude - an increase in
inequality. For the remainder, a clear pattern does not emerge, however. Contrary to initial
expectations countries such as, for example, Italy and Austria are characterised by even larger
increases in inequality than the US and the UK. The Nordic countries show a stable distribution.
The Netherlands has a unique pattern: compression in the top and increased inequality at the
bottom. 
Observation Inequality increased in most countries from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s.
This observation suggests that a similar force has been at work in most countries. At the same
time, there is a variety of country-specific developments in which no clear pattern can be
discerned that ask for further explanation. We turn to this in Section 5.
A view on the long run
The basic long-run facts that we aim to explain are reported in Table 2.1. Although the
presentation in this table is confined to the US, the general message that can be obtained from
this table applies universally. The first column in Table 2.1 describes the relative wage change of
college graduates compared to those who completed high school for the US from 1940 to 1996.
A few numbers stand out: (i) between 1980-1990, the skill premium increased most rapidly
(based on a comparison of relative wage changes over 10-year periods); (ii) the skill premium did
not rise continuously; it fell both in the 1970s as well as in the 1940s. Note that the relative
supply of skilled labour has steadily increased. The most rapid increase took place in the 1970s;
an increase that coincided with a fall in the skill premium. 
Observation In the United States inequality fell in the 1970s, but increased on average
substantially in the last decades despite a monotonous increase in the relative
supply of skills.
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Table 2.1 US college/high school wage premium, supply and demand shifts, 1940-1996 a
Relative wage change Relative supply change
1940-1950 -1.86 1.49
1950-1960 0.83 2.93
1960-1970 0.69 2.65
1970-1980 -0.74 4.30
1980-1990 1.51 2.48
1990-1996 0.40 2.35
1970-1996 0.39 3.06
a
 Source: Autor et al. (1998). Changes refer to 100 x annual log changes. The relative wage is the log of the hourly wage differential for college
graduates (those with sixteen or more years of schooling) relative to high school graduates (those with exactly twelve years of schooling). The
supply and wage-share are defined accordingly.
The relative wage of college educated versus high-school educated increased over the long run,
decreased in the 1970s and increased strongly in the 1980-1990s. The relative supply of college
educated increased throughout the period that we consider. The fundamental question that we
need to address is why the relative wage did not fall facing such a large increases in relative
supply.
To summarise the facts discussed in this section, two points stand out: 
(i) The observations suggest that a similar force has been at work in the recent decades as
inequality tends to increase in all countries. To confidently draw such a conclusion, however, we
first need to further explore how the supply of skill evolved over time and across countries. 
(ii) The skill premium does not increase monotonically over time. 
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Inequality dynamics
The dynamics of inequality are hard to capture in a few numbers, but they are important. To illustrate this, imagine
the following very unequal society. People entering the job market all earn 5 dollars per hour for the first 10 years
that they work and they get 80 dollars per hour ever after. This society is unequal in a static sense, but over the
entire lifetime everybody earns the same. If one could borrow against future earnings, such a society could be
completely egalitarian.
The relevance of the previous example is empirically illustrated by Flinn (2002). He shows that the cross-sectional
wage distribution of young Italian males is more compressed than the comparable distribution for young white US
males (using individual-level data for Italy and the US). In contrast, however, the distribution of lifetime welfare is
no more disperse in the US than in Italy. The explanation is that the high frequency of movements between labour-
market states in the US leads to a relatively equal distribution of long-run welfare.
A second dimension of the dynamics of inequality is provided by the inter-generational dynamics: is a family’s
offspring predestined to end up on the same part of the wage distribution or are these (close to) random events?
Solon (2002) provides data on the cross-country differences in inter-generational earnings mobility. In the table,
a higher number indicates less inter-generational mobility.
Solon concludes – while taking into account the methodological differences of the studies – that the UK and the US
(the latter is not in the table) are less mobile societies than, for example, Canada, Finland and Sweden. To assess
this properly, however, is a difficult task (as the existing inequality level is importantly interfering with the measure
presented in the table). 
To conclude, there are some important differences between static, dynamic and inter-generational inequality. Each
inequality measure focuses on a different aspect of inequality. Reducing one type of inequality may require different
policy measures than reducing another type. In this study, our focus is on static inequality. 
Estimates of Inter-generational Earnings Elasticities
Sample $
Fathers in working-class York, England, in 1950 and their sons 0.42
Swedish Level of Living Surveys 0.28
Canadian income tax records 0.23
German Socio-Economic Panel 0.11
British National Child Development Survey 0.57
Fathers in Sweden, in 1955 and their sons born in 1939-46 0.14
Co-residing fathers and sons in two south African surveys 0.44
Finnish censuses 0.22
Malaysian Family Life Surveys 0.26
Finnish censuses 0.13
Swedish income tax records 0.13
German Socio-Economic Panel 0.34
Source: Solon (2002).
 7 We make the classification more precise later on. A more detailed subdivision of the labour market is made where
necessary.
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2.2 Framework of Analysis
A simple framework is applied for analysing the complex question on the causes of the observed
relative wage change. We analyse demand and supply for two types of labour, referred to as
high-skilled (H) and low-skilled labour (L).7 Essentially demand and supply for each skill type
meet on separate labour markets where the equilibrium wage for that skill type is set. As in any
market, institutional arrangements can prevent the market from clearing. Unemployment and
an above-equilibrium wage rate are the consequences. These separate labour markets do,
however, not operate in isolation. There are demand spillovers from other factor markets,
notably (i) from the market for the other type of skill (the two skill types tend to be substitutes) ,
(ii) from the labour markets in other countries (through changes in import and export prices)
and (iii) from the market for other inputs, notably capital (capital tends to complement skill).
A schematic overview of this framework is:
where time and country subscripts are omitted for reasons of expositional clarity. W, A and P
stand for wages, technology and prices, respectively (the subscripts refer to skill types). Finally, K
stands for physical capital. We return to the different elements of the equation in greater detail
below.
We do not discuss the literature on the role for trade in explaining wage inequality, as a
consensus is emerging that this is only a limited one. The basic intuition for the lack of evidence
is that the trade flows between developing and developed countries are simply not sufficiently
large. International trade takes mainly place among developed countries. Besides, large
economies like the European Union and the United States are relatively closed: domestic trade is
far more important than international trade. Important contributions to this discussion are
Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Sachs and Shatz (1995), who argue in favour of an important
role for trade and Berman et al. (1994), Bound and Johnson (1992) and Lawrence and Slaughter
(1993), who downscale the role for trade. For overviews see Katz and Autor (2000) and Nahuis
(2003). Thus, in the remainder we drop the price term.
 8 For an extensive discussion of the impact of migration see Borjas et al. (1997).
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3 Trends and analysis
This section describes the development of the elements introduced above over time and across
countries. It is meant as a description of empirical facts on which the analysis in Section 4 will
elaborate.
3.1 The supply of skills
The supply of skills in a country is mainly determined by the fraction of the population that
attends school and the number of years people spend in the educational system. There are,
however, other influences on the supply of skill. First, experience is a component of the available
skill in a country that is often gathered by on-the-job learning. Second, immigration of workers
affects the (distribution of the) supply of skills.8 Finally, the quality of the educational system is
an important determinant of the ‘effective’ skills that are gathered from attending school. 
This section sheds light on the evolution of the dominant factor of the (growth of the) supply
of skills, namely the flow of people through the educational system. Especially for depicting the
evolution of skills over time, this is an appropriate measure. For describing differences across
countries, more information is needed on the country-specific relevance of on-the-job learning
and the quality of the educational system. 
Figure 3.1  The growth rate of the supply of skills versus the initial endowment of skills
Source: De la Fuente and Domenech (2000).
 9 Details on the definition of our measure of human capital can be found in De la Fuente and Domenech (2000).
10 For an elaboration on the determination of the future development of the skill premium in the Netherlands we
refer to Jacobs (2002).
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In Figure 3.1, the horizontal axis depicts the average number of years of schooling in the
population in 1960.9 This varies roughly from 4 to 11 years. The vertical axis depict the growth
rate of the average years of schooling in the population from 1960 to 1995. An ‘x’ depicts one
observation, viz. one country. Two results stand out: first, during the last decades all countries
have experienced a large increase in the supply of skill (the growth rates range up to 60 percent).
Second, there is a clear negative correlation between the growth rates and the initial levels of
schooling. This points at a process of convergence of human capital stocks across countries. An
important implication of this is that the growth in the supply of skill within the group of
countries in the sample is unlikely to remain equally high. The simple reason for this is that the
observed growth rates are to a large extent due to ‘catching-up’ of stocks of human capital that
will peter out over time. The figure below reiterates this point by depicting projections for the
relative supply of skilled workers in the Netherlands for the period 1969-2020.10
Figure 3.2  The relative supply of skills in the Netherlands, 1969-2020.
Source: Jacobs (2002).
 11 This sections draws upon Acemoglu (2002) and Acemoglu (1999b).
12 Technology is in quotes, as this is a typical example of the economists’ view of technology: something that
should be there, but we do not know what it is.
13 Two familiar special cases are: (I) F= 0; a Leontief function; there is no substitution possible; the wage ratio is
insensitive to supply and (ii) ; an additive function; skilled and unskilled workers are perfect substitutes andF 6 4
the wage ratio is also insensitive to supply changes.
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The ratio of skilled to unskilled workers increased at a relatively high rate until 2000, whereas
from then onwards the ratio tends to stabilise at 40%. 
Observation The increase in the supply of skills in OECD countries is bounded and likely to
run into these bounds within the next thirty years.
3.2 The demand for skills11
So far we discussed the supply of skills and the relative wage of skilled versus unskilled workers
by presenting empirical facts. In order to determine the demand for skills we have to follow a
different strategy as the demand for skills is not observable. But, given that we know the skill
supply and the wage, we can infer what demand must have been. This only provides reliable
results if we know how the labour market and the production process work. In this section we
assume that we know all this: more specifically, we assume that the labour market clears (for all
skill groups) and that the production process is characterised by a constant elasticity of
substitution among the inputs (a CES production function) and that we know how well different
skill types can be substituted. Although stylistic, these simplifications enable us to deliver some
important insights.
A simple model for the skill premium
The production function for the aggregate economy takes the (CES) form
where iz and AL and AH are factor-augmenting ‘technology’ terms.12 The elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled workers in this production function is . SkilledF / 1/ (1 & D)
and unskilled workers are substitutes when the elasticity of substitution exceeds one and
complements when the elasticity of substitution is less than one.13 The value of the elasticity of
substitution will play a crucial role as the impact of an increase in the productivity of skilled or
unskilled workers depends on the value of the elasticity of substitution. In a competitive labour
market it holds that:
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This expression provides some important economic insights. First, an increase in H/L lowers
the skill premium. Second, an increase in AH can either complement or “replace” skilled
workers, depending on the substitution elasticity. Presuming the (empirically supported) claim
that  F>1, AH complements skills. The final story that this expression tells is that for the skill
premium not to fall with increases in the relative supply of skills, AH / AL should increase
accordingly. 
Observation Since the supply of skills increased in most countries, something should have
shifted demand for skill; more precisely, high-skilled augmenting
technological progress should have increased at a faster rate than low-skilled
augmenting technological progress (i.e., AH / AL should have increased).
This observation is purposely vague. We make it more precise later on. 
An empirical strategy to identify the demand shift is to take logs of the expression above and
to estimate it:
Depending on the type of data, the first term on the right-hand-side is estimated as a constant
(in a cross section), as a time-trend (with time-series data), or as time-dummies (with panel
data).
Katz and Murphy (1992) estimated the above equation for the US from 1963-1988 and
found:
and hence the elasticity of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers is about 1.4
(=1/0.7)and the skill premium increases ! holding relative supply constant ! with 3.3% a year!
A constant or increasing trend in demand?
The demand trend is responsible for the fact that the skill premium did not dramatically fall
throughout the 20th century despite the continuing increase in the relative supply of skilled
 14 This procedure is a variation on Murphy et al. (1998), who find a similar pattern.
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workers; there was a positive demand trend on average. In order to shed light on recent labour
market experience, it is important to be more precise. There has been an acceleration in the
increase of relative demand for skill in the 1980s. Figure 3.3 illustrates this point (it depicts time-
dummies from a panel inequality regression that corrects for human capital supply and country
specific effects only; we discuss this in greater detail in Section 5).14
Figure 3.3  Time specific deviations from a constant demand trend for skills
Source: Own estimation. For data sources see Section 5 (footnote 24) and the Appendix.
What the figure reveals is that the deviations from a constant demand trend are negative from
the early 1970s to 1980, whereas a steep turn upward is present up till the 1990s. In other
words, the pressure on inequality has substantially increased in the 1980s, while it decreased in
the 1970s.
3.3 Putting the pieces together
The first column in Table 3.1 shows the relative wage change of college graduates compared to
those who completed high school for the US from 1940 to 1996. Recall that: (i) in the period
1980-1990, the skill premium increased most rapidly when comparing 10-year periods; (ii) the
skill premium did not rise continuously. In the 1970s it fell as well as in the 1940s. Note that the
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Table 3.1 US college/high school wage premium, supply and demand shifts,
1940-1996 
a
Relative wage
change
Relative supply
change
Relative demand
change
Relative wage change if the
supply change is zero?
1940-1950 -1.86 1.49 -1.11 -0.79
1950-1960 0.83 2.93 4.09 2.92
1960-1970 0.69 2.65 3.62 2.59
1970-1980 -0.74 4.30 3.26 2.33
1980-1990 1.51 2.48 4.60 3.29
1990-1996 0.40 2.35 2.91 2.08
1970-1996 0.39 3.06 3.60 2.57
a
 Source Autor et al. (1998). Changes refer to 100 x annual log changes. The relative wage is the log of the hourly wage differential for college
graduates (those with sixteen or more years of schooling) relative to high school graduates (those with exactly twelve years of schooling). The
supply and wage-share are defined accordingly. The demand shift is not observed, but is determined as the implied demand shift that results if the
aggregate elasticity of substitution is equal to 1.4.
relative supply of skilled labour has steadily increased. The most rapid increase took place in the
1970s. This increase coincided with a fall in the skill premium. 
Figure 3.4 puts the numbers of the first column of Table 3.1 together graphically and reveals that
the skill premium has been enormously depressed around the Second World War (WWII) and
that the recent surge in inequality has ‘only’ restored inequality to the pre WWII level (see
Section 4.2 for an elaboration).
 15 The counterfactual increase in inequality would be lower if the elasticity of substitution between high- and low-
skilled workers was higher.
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Figure 3.4  The skill premium over the long run
Source: See Table 3.1.
Observation In the United States, inequality is not at an unprecedentedly high level today.
This observation is driven by the fact that inequality in 1940 is roughly equal to inequality in
1996. A more alarming way of saying the same is: inequality has not been so high for the last
60 years. 
Figure 3.5 shows how inequality would have evolved if supply had not accommodated the
demand trend; inequality would have risen dramatically. We show two what-if scenarios. First,
the dotted line shows how inequality would have evolved had the supply of human capital
remained constant at its 1970 level. The actual increase in inequality since 1970 was about 15%;
the counterfactual increase in inequality would be about a 100%! The counterfactual experiment
for 1940-1996 shows an even more dramatic result.15
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Figure 3.5  Relative wage if relative supply had been constant
Source: Own calculations based on Table 3.1
If, as we argue, the growth in the supply of skills will flatten in the future and the demand trend
continues to evolve as in the last three decades, inequality will increase drastically.
Observation With a continuing demand trend and a lower growth rate of the supply of
skills, inequality will increase substantially.
This observation is to be qualified by some uncertainties that we discuss in the next section.
 16 Quality can in our stylised model be seen as an element of A.We interpret H and L as the number of high- and
low-skilled workers and A
H
 and A
L
 as their effectiveness, which is, amongst others, determined by quality of
schooling.
17 See Leuven et al. (2002) who make this point forcefully.
18 The IALS scores are the arithmetic average of the scores on three tests (see Leuven et al., 2002). The numbers
are transformed to facilitate comparison with the years of schooling data.
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4 Scenarios for the future: Expectations and uncertainties
4.1 Uncertainty about the future development of the supply of skills
In characterising the supply of skills, years and type of schooling do not tell the whole story. As
mentioned before, experience effects and migration affect the human capital stock. But even
more important, especially when comparing stocks across countries, the quality of the
educational system might differ across countries. For two reasons it is important to take a closer
look at quality16: first, differences in quality across countries might hamper comparison;17
second, quality might be a dimension of skills that still leaves room for improvements and is a
dimension where policy can play a direct role. 
To assess quality we use “output data” of the educational system; The International Adult
Literacy Survey of the OECD is a collection of comparable data about the numeracy and literacy
skills of the adult population in seven countries. We compare this with the “input data”
discussed above: the average number of years of schooling. Figure 4.1 depicts, for a limited set of
countries, the data of the two sources for 1995.18
Average years of schooling per country vary from a low 11.1 in Sweden to above 13 for Germany
and the United States. When the IALS scores are used as skill measures the picture is very
different. Sweden has the highest score, with the Netherlands ranking second. The United States
now ranks lowest. The correlation between the two measures of skill is negative. This is not to
suggest causality, of course, but to emphasise the caution that is required in comparing
information across countries.
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Observation The quality dimension of the educational system differs substantially across
countries. Notably the United States has a low quality compared to the
quantity.
If countries succeed in increasing the quality of the graduates aggregate supply of skills, this can
exert downward pressure on the skill premium. Whether it leads to lower inequality is a
different matter as those who already are relatively well of – the educated – experience an
increase in quality (read: wages).
Figure 4.1  Comparing educational quality and quantity
Source: Leuven et al. (2002).
4.2 Uncertainty about the future development of the demand for skills
Unless we know what is behind the demand-trend, we are unable to say something sensible
about the likelihood of that trend continuing in the future. This section explores the potential
driving forces. 
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4.2.1 The great compression
The remarkable compression of the wage structure in the period 1940-1950 might be telling
interesting stories with respect to a potential return to a bias in demand favouring the unskilled
(see Figure 4.2). Goldin and Margo (1992) provide a thorough analysis of this period. There are
two preliminary issues to be resolved. First, was the compression a mere continuation of a trend
originating much earlier than the war? Though data for the earlier period are scarce and the
Great Depression of the 1930s interfered, Goldin and Margo conclude that prior to 1940 there
was no clear compression. The second preliminary question is – for the past to be informative
about the future – how much of the compression is to be attributed to the war and the
accompanying command economy. The war does not explain the major part of the story.
Although the role played by the National War Labor Board and the increase in the minimum
wage may have been substantial, the compression continued long after the war suggesting that
underlying market forces were at work. Moreover, both compression at the bottom, as well as at
the top of the wage distribution were responsible for the overall decrease in inequality.
Figure 4.2  Log wages 90th-10th percentile US
Source: Goldin and Margo (1992).
The enduring low level of inequality after the war is explained by supply and demand and related
institutional factors. First, those people who served in the army were given generous financial
support to educate themselves, which induced a drastic increase in supply of skills. Second, the
period 1940-1950 was exceptional in that the demand for unskilled kept up with the demand for
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skilled. Finally, a strong labour movement in the 1950s supported strong unions that
compressed the wage structure. 
Acemoglu et al. (2002) explore an alternative explanation for the enduring compression that
could be responsible for the “observed” change in demand, namely changes in female labour
participation induced by the millions of men mobilised to serve the armed forces. They find that
women substitute for men with some intermediate level of skill, which is plausible given that
men at the low end of the skill distribution were likely to be employed in (heavy) manual
occupations. This induced wage compression between intermediate and low skilled. However,
when estimating the overall impact of female participation on male wage inequality the impact
is positive, leading to the conclusion that without the female participation response the great
compression would have been greater! This finding emphasises that the 1940-1950 era was
characterised by a demand bias relatively favourable to the unskilled.
Observation A demand bias favouring unskilled is not an unknown phenomenon. Though
analysis of the past decades reveals a continuing demand shift favouring the
skilled, the 1940-1950 period was relatively favourable to unskilled.
4.2.2 What demand trend?
Recall the observation derived in the previous section:
Observation Since the supply of skill increased in most countries something should have
shifted demand for skill; more precisely, high-skilled augmenting
technological progress should have increased at a faster rate than low-skilled
augmenting technological progress (i.e., AH / AL should have increased).
The question that we address here is what is behind the demand trend. 
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Evolution of inequality in middle-income countries and what Hecksher and Ohlin tell
The observed increase in the skill premium, together with the more pronounced presence of low-wage countries
in the global economy due to increased integration and reduced transport costs, leads many to conclude that the
latter is causing the former. The argument that global market integration leads to the increase in the wage gap is
fairly persuasive for many people. Economists have also been sympathetic to the argument because the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, related to the Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, provides a readily available tool of analysis. To
illustrate the logic of the theorem we will run through an example based on the situation in the US. Suppose the
US is skilled-labour abundant. Furthermore we assume that the US starts trading with low or middle income
countries (LMIC) due to a decline in trade barriers erected by the LMIC. The US will shift production towards the
skilled-intensive goods industries (as the relative price of the skilled-intensive good increases). As the shrinking
sector is unskilled-intensive, it releases relatively plentiful unskilled workers. Thus, the relative wage of the unskilled
has to decrease in order to get the unskilled absorbed in the skilled-intensive industry. This change in the relative
factor reward also changes the factor-input ratio in both industries. In the LMIC, the opposite happens; most
importantly, the relative wage of unskilled workers increases. 
The table below indicates that the relative position of unskilled in the LMIC deteriorated too in the period 1980-1990.
Hence the most important prediction does not come through. This again suggests that the demand trend is
pervasive across countries.
For the US and many other countries the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not explain much of the increase in
inequality as, most importantly, there is no evidence that the relative price of unskilled-intensive goods fell.
Inequality in middle income countries
Country Year last survey Year first survey Percentile ratio in last
year
Annual change in log
percentile ratio
 (90/10) * 100
Czech R. 1996 1992 3.01 5.98
Hungary 1994 1991 4.19 7.06
Poland 1995 1986 4.04 1.56
Russia 1995 1992 9.39 11.45
Mexico 1998 1989 11.55 2.32
Source: LIS.
Biassed technology or capital skill-complementarity?
In the previous analysis, the demand trend was imputed instead of observed. Everything that
cannot be explained by changes in supply is to be driven by changes in demand. As discussed in
the box, demand changes related to international trade cannot explain a large part of the
imputed demand movement. What is left of the demand change is, in an overwhelmingly large
part of the literature, attributed to biassed technological change. The ICT revolution is the
obvious candidate for being the driving force behind this bias.
 19 Arranz (2001) argues that 56% of the demand change is explained by biassed technological change, whereas
44% is explained by capital-skill complementarity. The difference is explained by the fact that Krusell et al. (2000)
impose too many restrictions in their model. Arranz argues that different patterns of
complementarity/substitutability exist and that the elasticities of substitution are not constant. Arranz does not
find evidence of equipment-skill complementarity as Krussel et al. do, but only IT-skill complementarity.
20 DiNardo and Pischke (1997) disagree on this. However, Autor et al. (1998) respond convincingly.
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That the technological trend is not observable leaves room for alternative factors, such as capital-
skill complementarity. Assuming that the ever cheaper and better capital equipment makes
skilled workers more productive whereas the unskilled worker have to compete with or are
replaced by capital (capital and unskilled workers are substitutes) can explain the observations
too. Krussel et al. (2000) show that the observable factors – the capital price and the relative
supply of skilled and unskilled workers – are able to explain the skill premium in the US for the
last 30 years.19
This result is to be contrasted with results derived in studies that attempt to make the
unobservable technology trend more observable. First, the existence of a large computer
premium that increases from 1984-1993 (Krueger, 1993; Autor et al., 1998) is taken as direct
evidence of skilled-biassed technical change.20 Second, there is evidence of a more general
technology-skill complementarity. An example of this evidence is the existence of positive
correlations in cross-sections across industries and plants of capital intensity and of indicators of
new technologies (computers, R&D intensity) with worker skills (Doms et al., 1997). Also the
positive correlation of the rate of skill upgrading with technology indicators like computer usage,
computer investment and R&D intensity are interpreted as direct evidence (Berman et al., 1994;
Autor et al., 1998; Machin and Van Reenen, 1998). The final example of general technology-skill
complementarity is the evidence of greater acceleration in skill upgrading in more computer-
intensive sectors (Autor et al., 1998).
Observation Capital-skill complementarity can explain the US observations. This, however,
is to be weighted against the substantial evidence that positively relates
technology to skill upgrading.
4.2.3 What bias is one thing, why a skill bias is another
So far we identified only what is behind the demand trend. A tentative conclusion is that a
"substantial" part of the demand trend is related to biassed technological change. In order to
assess the likelihood of a future continuation of this bias, understanding why technology is
biassed in the first place is necessary. The first view is that a major innovation – the invention of
the microprocessor – temporarily accelerates demand for skills in order to implement the new
technology (see Bartel and Lichtenberg, 1987 and Bartel and Sicherman 1999). A second view is
that the current technological paradigm is inherently biassed towards skills. One way of
 21 Acemoglu (1999a) provides a mechanism that gives rise to an increase in inequality when the supply of skills
increases, but different from the other papers mentioned in the text; it does not use innovation theory. He shows
that when the size of the market for skills increases it may become cheaper to post a vacancy targeted at the skilled
and thereby raising their attractiveness and wage. 
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understanding this is, for example, to think of ICT as a technology that raises solely the
productivity of R&D workers. As R&D workers are skilled this would lead to a permanent
increase in the skill premium. This is not truly an explanation, but it is important to note the
difference between the temporary effect and the permanent effect. The third view is that a
permanent bias in technology can be explained by economic factors too. Technology is not
inherently biassed, but biassed due to the incentive to create such a bias. Technology is non-rival
– the same technology can be used at no additional cost by more people – and therefore
technology is driven towards the largest markets. Having noted the enormous increases in the
supply of skill (read: the market for skill biassed technology) it is not surprising to see a strong
bias in technology too (see Acemoglu, 1998, Acemoglu, 1999a21 and Nahuis and Smulders,
2002).
A few remarks are in place here. (i) It is not correct to conclude from this last mechanism
that an ever -accelerating circular mechanism is created like: a skill bias leads to higher skill
premiums which leads to a long-run increase in skills which again leads to a skill bias, etc. This
link is broken by the fact that increasing the supply of skill is getting more costly as more
workers are skilled already. (ii) Integration with low-skilled abundant countries does not
necessarily make the market for unskilled technology larger. This depends on the intellectual
property rights regime that prevails; if copying is 'allowed', the technology firms cannot reap the
benefits of the larger market for unskilled technology. (iii) If international trade lowers the wage
of unskilled workers, the induced technology mechanism magnifies this effect. (iv) Finally,
policy fostering the supply of skills to reduce inequality is hampered by the induced technology
mechanism.
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 22 We refer to the Appendix for an extensive discussion of this measure and a robustness analysis of the results
obtained in this section by using alternative measures for income inequality. We prefer this measure because it is
available for long time periods (which only holds for the Theil inequality measure and the EHII measures) and
because it measures income inequality instead of pay-inequality for the manufacturing sector as the Theil measure
does. 
23 The EHII measure is available for the period 1963-1998, but we only have time series for institutions covering the
period 1963-1992 (from Golden et al., 2002). For reasons of comparability of the regression equations in Table 5.1,
we have therefore restricted the time period considered to 1963-1992.
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5 The determinants of differences in inequality across space and time
So far, we discussed several explanations for differences in income inequality across countries
and its evolution over time. Apart from differences in supply of skills and biassed technological
progress, these differences are often attributed to differences in the labour-market institutions.
This section aims at empirically investigating the determinants of the differences in inequality,
simultaneously accounting for differences in supply, technological progress and institutional
settings.
Our main results are contained in Table 5.1. This table contains regression equations in which
our measure of inequality is the Estimated Household Income Inequality Measure.22 The
investigated time period is 1963-1992.23 The analysis controls for time-invariant country
characteristics by means of country-specific fixed effects. Thus, we consider mainly changes over
time. The remainder of this section uses the results presented below to draw conclusions on the
empirical relevance of the different explanations for changes in inequality. These discussions are
extended with circumstantial evidence from the existing literature. 
 24 Figure 3.3 is constructed by estimating an analogous equation to column (II) in Table 5.1, but with time-
dummies for each year instead of a time trend.
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Table 5.1 Regression results. Dependent variable Log of Estimated Household Income Inequality measure
Additional controls Time Differences in
supply
Unemployment Technology A different
institutional
setting
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Time 0.002
  (11.9)
0.004
(7.0)
0.009
(13.3)
0.004
(6.7)
0.004
(5.6)
Log of human capital  -0.224
(3.67)
-0.827 
(11.9)
-0.237
(7.7)
-0.199
(2.9)
Log of std unemployment 0.027
(7.8)
Log of union density -0.061
(6.5)
Log of bargaining level -0.004
(0.9)
Log of GDP per capita
growth
0.004
(2.1)
Country specific fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
R2-adj.  0.83  0.84  0.90 0.84 0.87
# panel observations 368 362 314 308 328
t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses. For data and their sources, see the Appendix.
Differences in supply of skills 
Differences in the (relative) supply of skills lead to differences in relative wages. In the previous
sections, we already argued that it is difficult to properly assess the relevance of this candidate
given the measurement problems in determining the quality of the supply of human capital.
Still, we try to test for the hypothesis that differences in income inequality are caused by
differences in supply. The measure that we use for the supply of skills is the log of human
capital (taken from Doménech and De la Fuente). We see in Table 5.1 that differences in supply
have a statistically significant negative effect on income inequality. This result strongly suggests
that a lack of human capital indeed results in increases in income inequality. Note that, once we
control for the supply of human capital, the time trend increases. This underlines the point of
the previous section that inequality would have been much higher had the supply of human
capital not increased so rapidly.24
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In the existing literature on this issue, Blau and Kahn (1996) attribute the substantially higher
level of wage inequality in the US to differences in institutions and not to differences in the
distribution of measurable characteristics (skills). This study was subsequently criticised by
Leuven et al. (2002) who argue that the skill measure used by Blau and Kahn is inappropriate as
it ignores differences in quality (see Section 4.1). They show that using a quality measure leaves
room for a substantial role for differences in supply. Acemoglu (2002) uses a very simply supply
and demand framework to explain the changes in skill premia across countries. Also in his
analysis, supply factors account for a significant component of the differences in trends in
inequality.
Observation There is fairly convincing empirical evidence that differences in the supply of
skills play a role in explaining differences in income inequality, both over time
as well as across countries. Care is required, however, as the measures that are
commonly used to determine supply face difficulties in appropriately
controlling for differences in the quality of skills. The fact that those studies
that make a serious attempt to correct for quality differences generally find
that supply differences matter may be seen as another indication for the
relevance of the supply-oriented explanation.
High minimum wages lead to unskilled unemployment in the EU
A popular explanation for differences in unemployment and wage inequality starts from the
notion that European institutions increase wages of unskilled workers above market-clearing
levels. This results in relatively low income inequality in Europe as compared to the US and
relatively high unemployment, especially among the unskilled. This explanation can be stated,
freely after Davis (1998), as follows: US inequality props up as European unemployment. 
If this explanation were to be correct, unemployment among unskilled should have
increased at a different rate than unemployment among the skilled in Europe as compared to
the US. This is investigated in Table 5.2. The table reveals that the increase in unemployment
over the 1980s was not markedly different between low- and high-skilled. Unemployment rates
increased for both types of workers in all European countries. 
Observation The increase in unemployment over the 1980s was not markedly different
between low- and high-skilled.
The puzzle is further complicated by the observation that the story does not only apply to
continental Europe, but also to the Anglo-Saxon countries (reported in Table 5.3).
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Table 5.2 Male Unemployment Rates by Education (Percentages)
Country and education 1971 - 1982 1983 - 1990 1991 - 1993
Germany
Total 31.0 56.0 41.0
High ed. 17.0 31.0 22.0
Low ed. 64.0 130.0 107.0
Ratio 38.0 42.0 49.0
Difference 47.0 99.0 85.0
Italy
Total 77.0 112.0 112.0
High ed. 122.0 131.0 125.0
Low ed. 46.0 73.0 75.0
Ratio 38.0 55.0 6.0
Difference S 4.7 S 5.8 S 5.0
Netherlands
Total 63.0 100.0 68.0
High ed. 32.0 57.0 50.0
Low ed. 70.0 140.0 99.0
Ratio 22.0 25.0 20.0
Difference 38.0 83.0 49.0
Spain
Total 89.0 169.0 151.0
High ed. 62.0 99.0 90.0
Low ed. 106.0 196.0 200.0
Ratio 17.0 20.0 22.0
Difference 44.0 97.0 110.0
Sweden
Total 24.0 25.0 58.0
High ed. 10.0 11.0 28.0
Low ed. 29.0 33.0 69.0
Ratio 29.0 30.0 25.0
Difference 19.0 22.0 41.0
Source: Nickell and Bell (1996).
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Table 5.3 Male Unemployment Rates by Education (Percentages)
Country and education 1971 - 1982 1983 - 1990 1991 - 1993
United Kingdom
Total 50 90 108
High ed. 24 44 62
Low ed. 75 159 171
Ratio 31 36 26
Difference 51 115 109
Canada
Total 68 91 115
High ed. 25 39 51
Low ed. 83 119 161
Ratio 33 31 32
Difference 58 80 110
United States
Total 49 62 60
High ed. 20 24 30
Low ed. 78 113 110
Ratio 39 47 37
Difference 58 89 80
Source: Nickell and Bell (1996).
These results are in line with what we report in Table 5.1. There we see that there is a statistically
significant positive relationship between inequality and the standardised unemployment rate.
The claim that the difference in unemployment and inequality performance between Europe
and the US is rooted in different labour-market institutions that increase unemployment in
Europe whereas they foster inequality in the US is therefore unlikely to be correct.
Observation Differences in labour-market institutions are unlikely to be responsible for
simultaneously explaining the relatively large income inequality in the US (and
the Anglo-Saxon countries in general) and the relatively low unemployment.
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Biassed technological progress
A next explanation for the increase in inequality over time emphasises biassed technological
progress. A simple way to test for this explanation is to consider whether there is a systematic
development over time of income inequality after correcting for other factors that might explain
the development of income inequality over time. The estimates for the time trend in all columns
in Table 5.1 indeed reveal that there is evidence for a uni-directional long-run change in
inequality, immaterial of the control variables included in the regression analysis. This suggests
that there is something left that has resulted in increases in income inequality, after controlling
for changes over time of supply of skills, institutional settings, etc. 
In order to assess the role for technology more directly we introduce a technology-related
variable in the regression model. We follow Galor and Moav (2000) who derive predictions for
the relation between (both exogenous and endogenous) growth and inequality. The results in
Table 5.1 reveal that growth and inequality are indeed positively correlated. Growth is interpreted
here as a proxy for R&D activity or other growth-enhancing policies.
Some qualifications are, however, in place here. The first is that the bias in technological
progress can be a temporary phenomenon associated with the arrival of, for example, a General
Purpose Technology (see Helpman, 1998, and Nahuis, 2003). To test for the relevance of such
an explanation, we would need data on the late 1990s to test whether the advent of the ICT can
indeed be interpreted as a General Purpose Technology that (initially) makes intensive use of
high-skilled labour resulting in increased income inequality. We have not been able to gather
consistent data to test for this. 
Second, there is an emerging consensus in the empirical growth literature that inequality is
bad for growth (for references see footnote 3). The estimates reported in column (IV) of Table 5.1
do not necessarily contrast with this literature. The literature referred to is based on a wider set
of countries and relies on cross-section information. We rely mainly on time-series information
for a sample of OECD countries.
A final qualification relates to the direction of causality. In the previous arguments, we have
taken the bias in technological progress as exogenous. An alternative view on what might have
happened (Acemoglu, 2002) is that high minimum wages have increased unskilled
unemployment, inducing firms to choose different technologies that also increased skilled
unemployment. The minimum wages in that case are responsible for increasing general
unemployment (both high- and low-skilled) via a direct effect on low-skilled unemployment and
an indirect effect via the direction of technological progress on high-skilled unemployment. This
explanation is consistent with the evidence reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3.
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Observation Skill-biassed technological progress is associated with changes in income
inequality. Open questions remain, however, regarding the direction of
causality and the question whether biassed technological progress mainly
affects short-run fluctuations in income inequality or (also) long-run changes. 
Institutional determinants
Finally, we turn to the institutional explanations. The results in Table 5.1 reveal that especially a
high union density (as well as – though statistically insignificant – a high bargaining level) lower
inequality. The previously discussed result on the effect of unemployment indicates that this is
an effect that goes beyond the effect that these institutions might have on unemployment. This
result indicates the relevance of institutional factors in explaining differences in income
inequality across countries. We explore this relationship further in an accompanying paper in
which we also consider the relevance of institutions for other indicators of economic
performance such as unemployment, productivity and GDP per capita (De Groot et al., 2003). 
Observation Differences in the institutional setting ! most notably union density ! across
countries are important determinants of differences in income inequality.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the determinants of changes in income inequality over time as
well as differences in income inequality across countries. In explaining the increase in income
inequality over time, we mainly explored the potential relevance of changes in the relative supply
of skills and biassed technological progress. Both factors may have contributed. Pinning down
the exact contribution of these factors is difficult because of measurement problems associated
with determining the quality of the supply of high- and low skilled labour as well as identifying
the sources of biases in technological progress. 
In explaining differences in the changes in inequality across countries, we find that
differences in labour market institutions (most notably trade unions) substantially depress
income inequality. Our analysis shows that this effect goes beyond the direct effect that labour
market institutions have on low-skilled unemployment. Hence, unions counter the upward
trend in inequality directly.
With respect to future trends, the major lesson from this paper is that it is plausible that
inequality is going to increase. Over the past decades, the increased demand for skills was a
lasting trend matched largely by an increase in the supply of skills. This increase in skills is
likely to run into bounds. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that the bias of
technological progress is endogenous and may well switch in favour of low-skilled workers
again. What exactly could trigger a change in the bias in technology is a question for future
research.
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26 Details of all sources can be found on the Internet at www.worldbank.org/research/growth/dddeisqu.htm
(Deininger and Squire), utip.gov.utexas.edu (University of Texas Inequality Project reporting the Theil measure and
the Estimated Household Income Inequality measure), www.lisproject.org (Luxembourg Income Study).
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Appendix
This Appendix describes and discusses the various data-sources that provide information on income
inequality as we have used them throughout the paper. Also other data used in this study are
described. Where relevant, we also perform robustness analyses of the results presented in the main
text of this paper by constructing Tables equivalent to those in the main text. 
Inequality measures
As we already discussed in the main text, there is a plethora of empirical measures proxying for
income inequality, each with its own pros and cons. In this paper, we have used the Gini measures
for income inequality as gathered by the Luxemburg Income Study (LIS) and Deininger and Squire
(1996), the Theil inequality measure taken from the University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP),
Atkinson measures and percentile ratios gathered by LIS, and Estimated Household Income
measures that were estimated by Galbraith and Kum (2003). For information on the primary and
secondary income distribution (before and after correction for taxes and transfers, respectively), we
rely on Bradley et al. (2001) who use LIS data as a source.25 
Without going into detail on all these different measures, it is useful to characterise the essential
differences between them since they have motivated our choice for the measures used in the main
text26: 
1. There are differences in time span. Long time series are only available from the UTIP and Galbraith
and Kum. Those therefore underlie the analysis in Section 5. 
2. The LIS has made a huge effort making the different inequality measures comparable across
countries. This makes this measure the ideal one, apart from the fact that no long time series are
available. 
3. The Theil measure provided by the UTIP is based on pay inequality in the manufacturing sector.
This is not our preferred measure for income inequality that we would like to be measured at
income level. For that reason, the Estimated Household Income Measure - though constructed - was
used in Section 5 instead of the Theil measure. 
4. The Atkinson, Theil, Gini and percentile ratios have different interpretations. Although larger values
of the indicators all imply larger income (or pay) inequality, the interpretation of the Gini measure
and the percentile ratios are most straightforward and are therefore preferred in the illustrations
in Section 2-4.
 27 The relatively low correlation between GINI_LIS and GINI_POST is due to the fact that the two sources use a
different definition of Germany (the former excludes East Germany whereas the latter includes it). Leaving out
Germany results in a correlation of 0.96.
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Correlation of inequality measures
In order to provide some feeling for the differences (and similarities) among these measures of (or
proxies for) income inequality, we have constructed a correlation matrix of all these measures for
the year 1989. This matrix is contained in Table A.1. The table reveals that almost all measures are
highly correlated, with the exception of the Gini measure from Deininger and Squire that is poorly
correlated with the Theil inequality measure and the Estimated Household Income measures.27
Other data and sources
Apart from the inequality measures that we have used before, Section 5 uses data that proxy the
explanatory variables for (changes in) income inequality. These data and their sources are:
• human capital. This variable measures the average years of schooling as reported by De la Fuente
and Doménech (2001). The original data are available at fuster.iei.uv.es/~rdomenec/human.html.
We have linearly interpolated the five-year observations to get complete time series. 
• standardised unemployment rate. Taken from Golden et al. (2002). Data are available at
www.shelley.polisci.ucla.edu/data. We refer to their codebook for original sources.
• union density. Taken from Golden et al. (2002). See above.
• bargaining level. Taken from Golden et al. (2002). See above.
Table A.1       Correlation matrix
GINI
_DS
THEIL
_INEQ
GINI_
LIS
ATKIN
SON_
5
ATKIN
SON_
10
PERC9
0_10
PERC9
0_50
PERC8
0_20
EHII2 EHII4 GINI_
PRE
GINI_
POST
GINI_DS 1.00 0.02 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.61 0.51 0.59 0.11 0.17 0.53 0.53
THEIL_INEQ 1.00 0.53 0.50 0.44 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.84 0.71 0.28 0.42
GINI_LIS 1.00 0.99 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.62 0.58 0.69 0.76
ATKINSON_5 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.56 0.53 0.72 0.74
ATKINSON_10 1.00 0.91 0.93 0.93 0.52 0.52 0.72 0.70
PERC90_10 1.00 0.89 0.97 0.57 0.51 0.53 0.64
PERC90_50 1.00 0.93 0.68 0.66 0.71 0.77
PERC80_20 1.00 0.57 0.50 0.56 0.65
EHII2 1.00 0.81 0.29 0.48
EHII4 1.00 0.44 0.48
GINI_PRE 1.00 0.88
GINI_POST 1.00
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Table A.2       Regression results. Dependent variable Log of Estimated Household Income Inequality measure
Additional controls Time Differences in
supply
Unemployment Technology A different
institutional
setting
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
time 0.002
  (8.4)
0.003
(4.6)
0.008
(13.3)
0.003
(4.5)
0.002
(2.7)
Log of human capital  -0.153
(2.2)
-0.710 
(7.9)
-0.181
(2.4)
-0.107
(1.4)
Log of std unemployment 0.010
(2.3)
Log of union density -0.044
(4.1)
Log of bargaining level -0.012
(2.3)
Log of GDP per capita
growth
0.002
(0.8)
Country-specific fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
R2-adj.  0.85  0.86  0.89 0.86 0.88
# panel observations 368 362 314 308 328
t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses
• GDP growth. This variable is defined as the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Data are
taken from the GGDC Total Economy Database 2003 (University of Groningen and the Conference
Board). The database is available at www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc. 
Robustness analysis
Tables A.2 and A.3 repeat the analysis discussed in Section 5, but now with alternative inequality
measures. Table A.2 uses the Estimated Household Income Inequality measure that is based on
four control variables instead of two as the one that we used in the main text. As can be seen, the
differences are minor. Table A.3 uses the Theil pre-tax income inequality measure from UTIP. For
this measure, the results are slightly less clear-cut than for the EHII measures. The time trend is
no longer uniformly positive (although in no case significantly negative). The result that more
human capital is associated with less income inequality stands upright. There is also no evidence
that unemployment and income inequality are negatively correlated (although we do not find a
significantly positive relationship as with the EHII measures). Finally, the effects of differences in
the institutional setting are comparable for the various inequality measures. 
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Table A.3       Regression results. Dependent variable Log of Theil inequality coefficient
Additional controls Time Differences in
supply
Unemployment Technology A different
institutional
setting
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
time -0.002
  (1.6)
0.026
(7.0)
-0.0514
(10.0)
0.029
(7.1)
0.02
(4.2)
Log of human capital  -3.282
(8.0)
-5.824 
(10.6)
-3.390
(7.7)
-2.733
(5.4)
Log of std unemployment 0.003
(0.1)
Log of union density -0.201
(2.9)
Log of bargaining level -0.013
(0.4)
Log of GDP per capita
growth
0.039
(3.0)
Country-specific fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
R2-adj.  0.89  0.91  0.91 0.91 0.91
# panel observations 368 362 314 308 328
t-statistics (in absolute values) are reported between parentheses
